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a b s t r a c t
This paper shows that introducing status concerns into a tournament model has substan-
tial implications for the provision of incentives. We emphasize the role of reference groups
and determine the optimal number of winners and losers in tournaments. To compensate
employees for the disutility of low status, a proﬁt-maximizing employer may be reluctant
to demote employees and instead reward workers through promotions. This rationalizes
the prevalence of compensation systems which reward winners without explicitly identi-
fying losers. Differences in ambition and ability affect contestants’ efforts and may result
in inefﬁcient promotion outcomes. We analyze how to mitigate these inefﬁciencies when
managing a diverse workforce by using mixed and segregated tournaments.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In a seminal paper Baker et al. (1988) discuss a number of common features of organizational compensation systems
that are hard to reconcile with the standard theory of incentives. Among these they include the prevalence of compensation
systems that reward ‘winners’ without explicitly identifying ‘losers’. This paper provides a rationale for the asymmetric
effects of rewards and punishments and for other puzzling features of actual compensation systems.
We consider a simple tournament model in which N risk-neutral agents compete for a set of prizes. However, we make
the realistic assumption that workers care about their relative standing, that is, their status within a group. In our model,
individual concerns for relative standing are captured by the reference-dependent nature of workers’ preferences.1 Thus, a
worker’s utility depends not only on his wage w and effort e, as in standard incentives models, but also on a “reference” or
“typical” wage,wR. Nonpecuniary gains and losses relative towR are interpreted asmeasuring themagnitude of theworker’s
status concerns relative to a chosen reference group. In particular,we posit that people dislike being behind in terms of status
in the organization, but enjoy being ahead of individuals in their reference group.
A crucial feature of this type of models is exactly how the reference point is determined. While in reality both objective
and subjective considerations are likely to affect the choice of wR, in the ﬁrst part of the paper we focus on objective factors
and assume that the referencewage is thewage thatmostworkers participating in the tournamentwill receive. For instance,
if few workers are promoted or demoted and most remain at the same intermediate level, then the ‘typical’ wage is the one
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1224 273423.
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1 See among others Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Koszegi and Rabin (2004).
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paid at the intermediate level. Likewise, if the majority of workers receive a bonus of 3 percent of their current salary, then
a bonus of 3 percent is the typical salary premium.
In this setting we study how a ﬁrm can take advantage of the interpersonal comparison of its workforce to increase
proﬁts. The most important ﬁnding is that, if the workers’ participation constraints are binding, the ﬁrm must com-
pensate its employees for the disutility that they may derive from low status. Therefore the ﬁrm may be particularly
reluctant to penalize or demote employees. In particular, and in contrast to a standard setting without status concerns
(e.g., Lazear and Rosen, 1981), we show that the choice of the tournament format is not neutral, and the ﬁrm is bet-
ter off choosing tournaments that reward winners instead of tournaments that penalize losers, since the former make
positive outcomes salient. When both promotion and demotions are considered, we show that under mild conditions
it is optimal for the ﬁrm to minimize the number of demotions and maximize the number of promotions, subject to a
reference-wage constraint that identiﬁes which of the prizes in the tournament is the reference wage. The model also
sheds light on other features of actual incentive schemes such as small salary premia, rat races and job title prolifera-
tion.
In the second part of the paper we turn attention to the personal, idiosyncratic factors that determine reference points.
In particular, we allow for individual differences in ambition, where ambition is deﬁned as the tendency to set for oneself a
high reference point. This deﬁnition is consistent with the central argument put forward by Heath et al. (1999) who argue
that goals can serve as reference points. Differences in ambition are interpreted and related to differences in reference
groups: for instance, women may have lower reference wages because they compare themselves not with workers in gen-
eral (male and female) but only with other female workers. Analogously, high ability workers may have higher reference
wages because they compare themselves only with other talented individuals.2 We show that ambitious workers always
exert more effort in equilibrium than their unambitious colleagues and that both types exert more effort in a segregated
tournament than in a mixed setting. We discuss our ﬁndings in light of the experimental ﬁndings documenting differential
performances in mixed and segregated tournament settings between men and women. If, as suggested by previous con-
tributions, men set for themselves higher reference points than women, then it is possible to explain these experimental
ﬁndings and the observed gender wage and promotion rate gap without invoking discrimination or differences in ability
or in outside opportunities. We further allow workers to differ also in terms of ability. In such a setting, it is well-known
that tournaments cannot in general match employees to the jobs for which they are best suited, since performance in
the current job is not necessarily the best indicator of performance in another job (Baker et al., 1988). We question the
practical relevance of that claim in the light of the fact that empirically ambition and ability are positively correlated. Our
model shows that if more able workers compare themselves to equally able workers and not to lower ability workers,
then more able individuals will exert more effort, thereby further increasing their chances of winning the tournament
and reducing the probability of an inefﬁcient promotion decision. Finally, we investigate the human resource question of
whether an organization should run mixed or segregated tournaments. We show that if differences in ambition are large
relative to differences in ability, then even ﬁrms that only care about promoting their most talented employees may ﬁnd it
optimal to design segregated tournaments since this effectively implements a quota system for their less ambitious employ-
ees. In contrast, ﬁrms that mostly care about performance in the current job always implement segregated tournaments.
This is because segregated tournaments create balanced competitions which in turn induce contestants to exert more
effort.
The key behavioural assumption of this paper is that people intrinsically care about relative standing. Frank (1985),
Robson (1992) and Zizzo (2002) also note that status might be valued per se. Huberman et al. (2004) provide experimental
evidence that subjects value status independently of any monetary consequences and are willing to trade off some material
gain in order to obtain it. Heath et al. (1999) argue that goals serve as reference points and alter outcomes in a manner
consistent with the value function of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). They present evidence that goals
inherit key properties of the value function such as a reference point and loss aversion. Furthermore, there seems to be
a reasonable amount of heterogeneity with respect to status-seeking behavior, in particular, marked gender and country
differences (Falk and Knell, 2004; Huberman et al., 2004; Gneezy et al., 2003).
Despite the vast body of empirical and experimental evidence on status and reference-dependency, until recently little
attention has been paid to the development of models of the labour market that incorporate these preferences. The large
majority of papers that incorporate these preferences do so by modeling the status of an agent as an increasing function
of the wage difference between the agent and other workers or the principal.3 That is, the more an agent earns relative
to his comparison group, the higher is his status. Fershtman et al. (2006), for instance, examine the effects of differences
in importance that workers give to their status relative to other workers to whom they compare themselves. They show
that, for equally productive workers, wages may vary, reﬂecting the different incentives that ﬁrms provide to workers with
different social concerns. Fershtman et al. (2003); Goel and Thakor (2006) show thatwhenworkers (ormanagers) care about
relative status, the optimal provision of incentives involves some form of joint performance evaluation, where the wage of
2 Tomaintain analytical tractability, however, in the second part of the paperwe consider only two-agent tournaments and set aside the role that external
factors have in determining the reference point.
3 A notable exception is the paper by Auriol and Renault (2008) in which status is not tied to wages since ﬁrms can provide status symbols that are
independent of wages and are costless for the ﬁrm.
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one agent is positively related to the performance and the wage of the other agents in the reference group even though
outputs are uncorrelated.
More closely related to the present paper is the work of Demougin and Fluet (2003) and Grund and Sliwka (2005) who
also focus on tournaments. While we concentrate on status concerns, they analyze the effects of inequity aversion, broadly
deﬁned as a preference for equitable or fair outcomes (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). As in
their papers we ﬁnd a positive incentive effect of behindness-aversion (‘envy’). However, these papers only focus on the
symmetric two-player case. Therefore, they cannot study the determination of the optimal number of winners and losers
and do not provide an explanation for the prevalence of promotion-based tournaments in practice. Furthermore, since they
do not allow for heterogeneity among agents, they are unable to explore the interaction effects of ambition and ability as
well as the resulting asymmetries in effort choices.4
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2we introduce themodel and discuss two-prize tournaments.
Section 3 extends the basic model to examine both promotions and demotions. Section 4 introduces worker heterogeneity
in terms of ambition, while Section 5 allows for ability differences. Section 6 concludes. All the omitted proofs are gathered
in Appendix A.
2. The basic model
There are N identical workers, or agents, indexed i = 1,2, . . . , N, N ≥ 2, who compete in a tournament. We begin by
considering a simple set-upwhere theNW ≥ 1 agents who produce themost output receive a wagewH , while the remaining
workers NL ≡ N − NW receive a wage wL . Individual output is given by xi = ei + εi, where ei denotes worker i’s effort and
εi is an error term with cumulative density function F(·), density f (·) and zero mean. We write i∈W if agent i is one of
the NW workers that produce the most output; otherwise we write i∈ L.5 Let wR ∈ [wL,wH] denote a reference wage. This
wage represents the ‘normal’ or ‘typical’ wage that the agents expect to obtain by participating in the tournament. Agent i’s
expected utility for any choice of effort is given by
Eui(ei) = Pr(i∈W)[wH + ˇ(wH − wR)] + Pr(i∈ L)[wL + ˛(wL − wR)] − c(ei) (1)
where the function c(·) denotes the cost of effort and is assumed to be strictly increasing and convex. Eq. (1) captures the
idea that in addition to monetary incentives, agents are also motivated by their relative standing within the group. That is,
they enjoy earning a wage that they consider high with respect to some standard, and dislike being below that threshold.
The parameters ˛ and ˇ, where ˛,ˇ ≥ 0, measure the importance of interpersonal comparisons and, more speciﬁcally, how
much workers dislike being ‘losers’ and enjoy being ‘winners’, respectively. We say that workers care more about relative
status if ˛ and ˇ are higher. We also assume that ˛ ≥ ˇ since there is very strong evidence that losses generally resonate
more strongly than gains (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1992).
Our framework is similar to the one commonly adopted in the inequity-aversion literature which uses the same speciﬁ-
cation, but assumes that ˇ ≤ 0, e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Although in some settings agents may dislike receiving more
than their peers, it is our belief that in competitive scenarios like promotion tournaments the assumption that ˇ ≥ 0 is an
equally good, if not better, description of actual behavior. Even Fehr and Schmidt (1999) “believe that there are subjects
with ˇ ≥ 0”, and that in competitive settings these particular inequity considerations are less important (Fehr and Schmidt,
2003). Furthermore, there is ample empirical evidence that status considerations where individuals beneﬁt from receiving
higher wages than their peers play an important role in the workplace (Frank, 1985). For example, using ordered probit
models Clark and Oswald (1996) show that workers’ satisfaction levels are negatively related to their comparison earnings
levels as deﬁned by their expected or predicted wage, both when workers earn less and when they earn more than their
comparison earning level. Moreover, Clark et al. (2008, p. 137) argue that “the broad consensus in the literature is that the
[Easterlin] paradox points to the importance of relative considerations in the utility function, where higher income brings
both consumption and status beneﬁts to an individual” and that “comparisons can either be to others or to oneself in the
past”.6 Note also that we assume that effort choices do not enter in agents’ relative payoff comparisons. This means that
status only depends on a comparison of wages, rather than action-adjusted wages. The rationale for this assumption is that
it is more difﬁcult to observe effort costs than rewards. Throughout it is assumed that agents make their effort choices
privately and so they can only observe and compare their ex-post realized wages.7
4 Our work is also related to a number of papers in the behindness aversion (‘envy’) literature, including Bartling and von Siemens (in press) and Dur and
Glaser (2008), and in the inequity aversion literature, including Rey Biel (2008), Englmaier and Wambach (2005), and Itoh (2004). Our paper differs from
these contributions in that we analyze a tournament setting with multiple agents.
5 The assumption that workers compete for promotion slots means that relative performance determines the identity of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. This is in
contrast to models where the performance of one’s co-workers does not affect one’s probability of promotion, since promotions are determined only by
the worker’s absolute level of performance. DeVaro (2006) provides evidence that relative performance of workers determines promotions.
6 Our speciﬁcation also encompasses the modeling approaches adopted by a series of other theoretical papers. If ˇ = 0 then the agent only suffers from
envy as in Dur and Glaser (2008) and Bartling and von Siemens (in press). If ˇ = ˛ then our speciﬁcation is identical to that of Fershtman et al. (2003, 2006)
and similar to Goel and Thakor (2006).
7 The alternative speciﬁcation in which agents compare action-adjusted wages would imply that agents would not be as averse to the high wage
realizations of other agents if they believed that these other agents worked harder. However, even with this alternative speciﬁcation our analysis remains
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A key element of the analysis is to identify plausible values for the reference wage wR. This is perhaps the thorniest issue
in the theory of reference-dependent preferences, and several possibilities have been explored. Here we assume that the
‘typical’ wage wR is that received by the modal group of workers. To be ‘typical’, however, we also require the modal group
to be considerably larger than the other group(s). We formalize this idea by assuming that the number of people belonging
to themodal group exceeds the number of individuals in the other group byD ≥ 1. However, if no such group exists, we take
the reference wage to be equal to the average of all the wages received by the agents, i.e. wR = (1/N)∑Ni=1wi. Formally we
assume that wR = wH if NW ≥ NL + D, wR = wL if NL ≥ NW + D, and wR = 1/N
∑N
i wi otherwise.
This deﬁnition implies that in a tournament where there is only one winner and many losers, the reference wage equals
wL . Thusworkers not promoted in tournamentswhere there is only a small number of winners, will not perceive themselves
as ‘losers’ but as being ‘normal’. In this section and the nextwewill also assume thatD ≤ N − 2, so that in principle a reference
group can always be created. This is important because we will show that a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm always has an incentive
to set a reference group so that it can reward winners without explicitly identifying losers.
Our goal is to study the behavior of a ﬁrm (principal) which takes into account the interpersonal comparison component
of workers’ preferences. The ﬁrm’s proﬁts are the sum of the agents’ outputs multiplied by the marginal value product V
which is the price of one unit of output x. Its objective is to maximize expected proﬁts
max
wH,wL,NH,NL
E˘ = V
N∑
i=1
ei − NWwH − NLwL
with respect to the endogenous variableswH,wL,NH andNL , subject to theworkers’ incentive andparticipation constraints8:
ei ∈ arg max Eui(ei) and Eui(ei) ≥ u¯ for all i.
This problem can be considerably simpliﬁed by focusing on a symmetric equilibrium where all workers exert the same
effort e. In that case, each worker has the same chance of winning the tournament and therefore Pr(i∈W) = NW/N and
Pr(i∈ L) = (N − NW )/N. Since theparticipation constraintsmust bind at the optimum, Eui(ei) = u¯ for all i. Plugging the binding
participation constraint into the expected proﬁts yields
E˘ = VNe − N[u¯ + c(e)] + NWˇ(wH − wR) + (N − NW )˛(wL − wR). (2)
We can also replace the workers’ incentive constraints with the corresponding ﬁrst-order conditions9:
∂Pr(i∈W)
∂ei
[(wH − wL) + ˛(wR − wL) + ˇ(wH − wR)] = c′(ei). (3)
The ﬁrm’s objective can thus be rewritten as to maximize (2) with respect to wH , wL , NW and NL subject to (3).
2.1. Tournament scenarios
To provide a foundation and some intuition for the following results, the remainder of this section will compare three
speciﬁc tournament scenarios in terms of equilibrium effort and proﬁts. For now we will take the number of winners and
losers in each tournament scenario as exogenously given. The next section will then study the optimal choice of NW and NL
in a more general framework and show how the reference wage should be optimally set.
2.1.1. Benchmark without status concerns (˛ = ˇ = 0)
We begin with the standard set-up where a ﬁrm’s workforce is only motivated by absolute monetary rewards. For given
NW and NL , the problem of the ﬁrm when ˛ = ˇ = 0 reduces to10
max
e
E˘T = VNe − N [u¯ + c(e)] (4a)
subject to
∂Pr(i∈W)
∂ei
(wH − wL) = c′(ei). (4b)
unchanged as long as all agents are ex-ante identical and a symmetric equilibrium in effort choices exists. In that case, in fact, agents would exert the same
effort and relative status would only be affected by the ex-post realization of wages. Note, however, that a symmetric equilibrium may not exist when
agents strongly care about receiving their “just deserts”, i.e. what they feel they deserve (Gill and Stone, 2009).
8 We do not impose limited liability whichwould requirewH,wL ≥ 0. Thus, thewageswH andwL could be negative as long as the participation constraint
is satisﬁed. Furthermore, since the noise term is independent of the effort choice and thus cannot be inﬂuenced by the agent, for the risk-neutral principal
maximizing effort and output is identical.
9 Throughout the paper we assume that ∂Pr(i∈W)/∂ei is strictly positive and ﬁnite. This implies that there must be at least one winner (i.e., NW ≥ 1).
10 Note that in (4a) we use workers’ effort e as the choice variable. This is legitimate because we can use the wage spread so as to induce any given effort
level in equilibrium (see Eq. (4b)). Of course, wL and wH must also be set so that in equilibrium the participation constraint binds.
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This set-up is a multiagent generalization of standard textbook treatments of tournament theory. In the following we will
compare this benchmark to the case where workers have concerns for relative standing, always assuming that the second-
order conditions of our programs are satisﬁed.
2.1.2. Promotion-based tournaments
In promotion-based tournaments, few workers receive the high wage (“are promoted”) and the majority stay at the
same level and receive the low wage. Thus, we assume wR = wL . We denote by NPBW the number of promotion slots, where
NPBW ≤ NPBL − D. Eqs. (2) and (3) become
max
e
E˘PB = VNe − N [u¯ + c(e)] + NPBW ˇ(wH − wL) (5a)
subject to
∂Pr(i∈W)
∂ei
(1 + ˇ)(wH − wL) = c′(ei). (5b)
Eq. (5a) differs from the benchmark case (4a) because of the term NPBW ˇ(wH − wL). In a promotion-based tournament it is in
fact the identity of the winners that is salient, and that positively affects workers’ utility. These gains, however, accrue to
the ﬁrm because in equilibrium wages are set such that the participation constraint binds.
2.1.3. Demotion-based tournaments
In this type of tournaments, most workers receive the high prize while only a few receive the low prize. We interpret
this situation as one where the majority of workers remain at the same hierarchical level (this time denoted by H) while
the worst are demoted and receive the lower wage wL . Thus, as in the previous scenario the typical outcome for a worker
is to remain in his or her current job. The difference is that incentives are now provided by the threat of demotion, not the
prospect of promotion.11
Since, by assumption, only a small number of workers receive the low wage, the reference wage is now wH . Let NDBW (≥
NDBL + D) denote the number of workers that stay at the same level. The problem of the ﬁrm is to
max
e
E˘DB = VNe − N[u¯ + c(e)] − (N − NDBW )˛(wH − wL) (6a)
subject to
∂Pr(i∈W)
∂ei
(1 + ˛)(wH − wL) = c′(ei). (6b)
The negative term (N − NDBW )˛(wH − wL), which is absent both in the benchmark case and in promotion-based tournaments,
now appears in (6a). These costs accrue because demotion-based tournaments, by making the identity of the N − NDBW losers
salient, tend to reduce workers’ utility. This implies that in equilibrium a ﬁrm’s proﬁts must decrease, since the ﬁrm must
guarantee its workers their reservation utility u¯.
2.2. Comparison of simple tournament scenarios
We are now in a position to compare these tournament scenarios in terms of equilibrium effort choices and proﬁts for
any given
(
NPBW ,N
DB
W
)
. We begin with the case where the wage spread w = wH − wL is exogenously given.
Proposition 1. For any given wage spread, (i) equilibrium effort is higher when workers care about relative status than when
they are only motivated by absolute monetary rewards. Furthermore, (ii) effort is higher in a demotion-based tournament than in
a promotion-based tournament if workers are sufﬁciently loss averse (that is, ˛ − ˇ is sufﬁciently large).
Proof. First note that the marginal probability of winning is in general a function of NW . To emphasize this fact, we write
(∂Pr(i∈W |NW ))/∂ei instead of (∂Pr(i∈W))/∂ei. Lemma A.1 in Appendix A shows that (∂Pr(i∈W |NW ))/∂ei is independent of
e since all workers choose the same level of effort. The ﬁrst part of the proposition follows immediately from (3) and (4b).
Part (ii) follows from the fact that (∂Pr(i∈W |NDBW )/∂ei)(1 + ˛)(wH − wL) > (∂Pr(i∈W |NPBW )/∂ei)(1 + ˇ)(wH − wL) if ˛ − ˇ is
sufﬁciently large. 
Thus, as noted by Grund and Sliwka (2005) and Demougin and Fluet (2003), concerns for relative ranking induce con-
testants to exert more effort than standard tournament theory would predict – a result consistent with the experimental
ﬁndings byHarbring and Irlenbusch (2008) and the view that interpersonal comparisonsmay lead towardwage compression
in ﬁrms (Frank, 1984, 1985).
11 Promotion and demotion-based tournaments will be special cases of the general framework developed in Section 3, where workers can either be
promoted, demoted, or remain at the same hierarchical level.
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Most importantly, ourmodelpredicts that effort should typically behigher in tournamentswhere losers arepunished than
in tournaments where winners are rewarded. Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003) provide empirical support for this prediction.
Theyﬁnd that in a controlled economic laboratory setting average effort signiﬁcantly increaseswith the proportion ofwinner
prizes. Harbring and Irlenbusch (2008) report results on effort choices in tournaments in which the proportion of winner
prizes varies across treatments with four and eight participants. While standard theory, based on the assumption of purely
selﬁsh agents, predicts that the provision of effort should be the same across the treatments, in line with the predictions
of our model they show that on average productive effort is higher when the proportion of winners is large (75 percent)
than when it is small (25 percent).12 Moreover, consistent with our theory, they ﬁnd that the number of participants who
completely drop out of the competition monotonically decreases with the number of winner prizes.
Our next step is to investigate how ﬁrm’s proﬁts vary with the choice of tournament format. If workers do not care about
interpersonal comparisons, it is irrelevant to the ﬁrm whether tournaments are promotion-based or demotion-based. This
is a standard result in the tournament literature which follows from Eqs. (4a) and (4b). The introduction of interpersonal
comparison changes this result.
Proposition2 (Asymmetric effects of rewardsandpunishments). Expectedproﬁts arehigher in apromotion-based tournament
than in a demotion-based tournament, both in the case where effort is ﬁxed across scenarios and in the case when it is chosen
optimally.
Proof. We begin with the case where effort e is ﬁxed at the same level across tournament scenarios. Eqs. (4a), (5a) and
(6a) imply that for all e, E˘PB (e) > E˘T (e) > E˘DB (e). We can also show that the same relationship holds when effort
levels are chosen optimally. To see this, let eT and ePB denote, respectively, the effort levels that solve (4a) and (5a). Then
E˘PB
(
ePB
)
≥ E˘PB
(
eT
)
> E˘T
(
eT
)
, where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the deﬁnition of optimality and the second
from the relationship between E˘PB (e) and E˘T (e). A similar argument applies to demotion-based tournaments. Thus
E˘PB
(
ePB
)
> E˘T
(
eT
)
> E˘DB
(
eDB
)
. 
Proposition 2 offers a possible explanation for “the prevalence of compensation systems that reward ‘winners’ without
explicitly identifying ‘losers”’ (Baker et al., 1988, p. 607). In our model, compensation schemes such as demotion-based
tournaments make the identity of the losers salient. This generates status costs ˛(N − NDBW )w that the ﬁrm must eventu-
ally bear since the participation constraint is binding. By contrast, promotion-based tournaments make the identity of the
winners salient. Ego rents ˇNPBW w are created, making it easier for the ﬁrm to meet the participation constraint. As a result
promotion-based tournaments dominate demotion-based tournaments from the principal’s perspective.
It is important to note that the status costs ˛(N − NDBW )w and the ego rents ˇNPBW w depend not only on the intensity
of status concerns
(
˛,ˇ
)
, but also on the equilibrium level of effort through w. This suggests that the ﬁrm may wish to
induce different effort levels in equilibrium to magnify or mitigate the impact of status on proﬁts. This intuition is captured
in the next result.
Proposition 3. When the wage spread is optimally chosen, effort is highest in a promotion-based tournament, lower in a
traditional tournament and lowest in a demotion-based tournament.
According to Proposition 3, ﬁrms should optimally induce high levels of effort in a promotion-based tournament to
magnify workers’ ego rents. We refer to this situation as a rat race for relative status. In a demotion-based tournament,
instead, the ﬁrms should induce low effort levels (relative to the orthodox case without status concerns) to mitigate the
impact of status on proﬁts. As status concerns become more important, the differences between these effort levels will
become more pronounced.
We conclude this section by examining the case when no group is considerably larger than the other and therefore no
reference group exists.
Proposition 4 (Optimality of reference groups). Firm proﬁts are higher in the case of a promotion-based tournament than
they are in a tournament where no reference group exists. Thus promotion-based tournaments dominate all the other
tournament scenarios.
To prove Proposition 4 we show that if a reference group does not exist, then status concerns are detrimental to the
ﬁrm because of loss aversion. This is perhaps counterintuitive since status concerns are often regarded as a cheap way of
providing incentives. However, bymaking the identity of thewinners salient, the ﬁrmcan increase proﬁts above the standard
benchmark E˘T or the casewhere no reference group exists. Indeed, as shown above promotion-based tournaments beneﬁt
the ﬁrm by creating ego rents while eliminating status costs. Thus our model offers a rationale for the prevalence of such
compensation systems as documented in Baker et al. (1988). Moreover, our results are in line with the almost complete
absence of demotion-based reward schemes found in the empirical studies of Teulings and Hartog (1998).
12 Interestingly, however, effort appears to be highestwhen there is a balanced proportion ofwinner and loser prizes (50 percent), though not signiﬁcantly
higher then when the proportion of winners is large (75 percent). Harbring and Irlenbusch (2008) attribute this puzzling ﬁnding to the fact that agents
may not condition their behavior on the true marginal probability of winning. Instead, they may perceive a task with a subjectively expected probability
of success of 1/2 as especially motivating.
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Finally, we formally show in Appendix A that many of our results do not depend on the relative magnitudes of ˛ and
ˇ or the sign of ˇ. If ˇ ≤ 0 Part (i) of Proposition 1 has to be amended as equilibrium effort is lower in a promotion-based
tournament than in a traditional tournamentwithout social comparisons.However, Part ii) of Proposition1 still holds. Finally,
the main prediction of our model, that expected proﬁts are higher in a promotion-based tournament than in a demotion-
based tournament, remains unchanged even when ˇ is negative, as long as ˇ is sufﬁciently small in absolute value relative
to ˛.
3. Promotions and demotions
This section extends the framework studied above by introducing an additional, intermediate hierarchical level. Atten-
tion will be focused on tournaments where few workers are promoted or demoted, and the majority remain at the same
hierarchical level. Our main goal will be to determine the optimal number of promotions and demotions. Thus NW and NL
will be regarded as endogenous in addition to the wages.
The expected utility of the worker is now
Pr(i∈W)[wH + ˇ(wH − wM)] + Pr(i∈M)wM + Pr(i∈ L)[wL + ˛(wL − wM)] − c(ei) (7)
where i∈M means thatworker i belongs to the intermediate, neutral class andwM ∈ [wL,wH] is thewage theworker receives
in that case. This formulation encompasses as special cases both promotion and demotion-based tournaments. Indeed, if
there are no demotions (NL = 0), then this setting reduces to a promotion-based tournament (here wM is the low wage),
while if there are no promotions (NW = 0), it reduces to a demotion-based tournament (here instead wM is the high wage).
Note that implicit in (7) is the assumption that staying at the same level is the ‘typical’ condition: promotion and demotions
are relatively rare events.13 This assumption is likely to be satisﬁed in practice because of switching and training costs. In
Proposition 6 below we will show that it can also be justiﬁed on the basis of incentive considerations.
Let w+ = wH − wM and w− = wM − wL . In a symmetric equilibrium, each worker’s effort solves
∂Pr(i∈W)
∂ei
(1 + ˇ)w+ − ∂Pr(i∈ L)
∂ei
(1 + ˛)w− = c′(e). (8)
Furthermore, the participation constraint (7) can be set equal to u¯ and incorporated into the ﬁrm’s proﬁts. This yields
VNe − N[u¯ + c(e)] + NWˇw+ − NL˛w−. (9)
The ﬁrm’s maximization program can thus be written as to maximize (9) with respect to w+, w−, NW and NL subject
to (8). Assuming ∂Pr(i∈W)/∂ei > 0, the incentive compatibility constraint (8) can be incorporated into ﬁrm’s program.
Substituting for w+ yields
max
e,w−,NW ,NL
VNe − N [u¯ + c(e)] + NWˇ
(∂Pr(i∈W)/∂ei)(1 + ˇ)
c′(e) + Kw− (10)
where K ≡ [(∂Pr(i∈ L)/∂ei)(1 + ˛)/(∂Pr(i∈W)/∂ei)(1 + ˇ)]NWˇ − NL˛. A key feature of this program is that, for all e and NW ,
it achieves its maximum when either w− = 0 or NL = 0, or both. Note in fact that K ≤ 0 and the relation ∂Pr(i∈ L)/∂ei ≤ 0
holdswith equality ifNL = 0. Since it is optimal tominimize the number of demotions, program (10) reduces to a promotion-
based tournament.Many of the qualitative features of this programhave already beendescribed in the previous section. Here
we focus onwhether it is optimal to maximize promotions (i.e. NW ), subject to the reference-wage constraint NM ≥ NW + D.
This is not a trivial question because, although it is clear that there is a beneﬁcial effect in increasing the number of people
who enjoy higher status, the effect on the incentives to exert effort must also be taken into account (in general in fact
(∂Pr(i∈W))/∂ei is a function of NW ).
Fortunately, a simple sufﬁcient condition can be provided to address this issue. Let agent i’s probability of placing jth
from the bottom be denoted by Pr(i, j). Suppose that
1
NW
N∑
j=N−NW+1
∂Pr(i, j)
∂ei
≥ ∂Pr(i, N − NW )
∂ei
. (11)
This condition states that the change in the probability of ending up at position NW + 1 from the top (N − NW from the
bottom) must be equal to or less than the average change in the probability of coming in at one of the ﬁrst NW positions.
This is a likely outcome if the density function of the error term is ‘well-behaved’. In fact, as long as more effort increases
the probability of ending up in a higher position more than in a lower position, the result holds. In particular, it is possible
to show (Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983) that the result holds for the uniform density f (ε) = a, ε∈ [−A,A] and the exponential
density f (ε) = eε−1, ε∈ [−∞,1].14
13 Formally, we assume that NM ≥ D + NW + NL , where NM is the number of worker who stay at the same level.
14 These are the distributions for which it is relatively easy to compute (∂Pr(i∈W))/∂e as NW changes. In the ﬁrst case, the net increase in the probability
of moving in and moving out of any interior position by working harder is zero. The increase in the probability of ‘winning’ is concentrated in the top
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Proposition 5 shows that if condition (11) holds, then the ﬁrm should maximize the number of promotions, subject to
the reference-wage constraint.
Proposition 5. Consider a three-prize tournament and suppose wR = wM . Under condition (11), the following conditions
completely characterize the optimal structure of the tournament: (i) either w− or NL = 0, or both, (ii) (neglecting integer
problems)NW = (N − D)/2 andNM = (N + D)/2, (iii)wM andwH are set such that theworkers’ participation constraint binds
and effort solves (10).
This result has important implications for the optimal provision of incentives in ﬁrms. The fact that it is often optimal to
maximize the number ofwinners (subject to the reference-wage constraint) andminimize the number of losers is consistent
with the empirical observation that demotions are very rare, whereas promotions are much more common (see, e.g., Baker
et al., 1994a,b). It also suggests that, should there be a ‘technologically right’ number of promotions and demotions, which
may correspond to the expected number of workers needed at higher and lower levels, demotions should be kept to the
minimum (possibly by hiring new workers), whereas promotions can be expanded above that limit. Finally, the result may
help explain the proliferation of job titles observed in some industries. As Baron and Bielby (1986) and Doeringer and Piore
(1971) have noted, in fact, many vertical and horizontal distinctions among jobs reﬂect customs and status gradations and
are not simply distinctions in technical duties.
It should be emphasized that Proposition 5 assumes that the reference wage is wM . This assumption might be seen as
restrictive since proﬁts could plausibly be increased by setting a lower reference wage, wL . The following proposition shows
that this is not the case.
Proposition 6. Without loss of generality one can restrict attention to optimal tournaments in which wR = wM .
The proof of Proposition 6 establishes that optimal tournamentswherewR = wM and thosewherewR = wL are equivalent
(setting wR = wH would obviously not be optimal). The intuition for this result is in part that, according to Proposition 5,
the intermediate prize wM is actually the lowest one, since NL = 0. A more subtle point is that if wR = wL , then there would
be two prizes, wH and wM , above the lowest one. If we set wR = wM , instead, there would be only one. Could the added
ﬂexibility of having two prizes above the lowest one (strictly) beneﬁt the principal? In Appendix A we show that if wR = wL ,
a tournament with only two prizes is optimal. This is reminiscent of Lazear (1989)’s result that in multi-prize tournaments
only the highest and the lowest prize matter and all the other prizes can be chosen arbitrarily. Since this added ﬂexibility
does not strictly beneﬁt the principal, setting wR = wM is indeed optimal.
4. Ambition
The model so far has assumed that reference wages are determined only by the objective structure of the game (the
tournament format). However, in reality workers’ personal characteristics often play a major role. This section introduces
an important source of heterogeneity among workers: ambition. We model ambition as an idiosyncratic choice of reference
point, with ambitious agents setting more demanding standards for themselves. In a tournament with two prize levels, for
instance, we would assume wRA = wH for ambitious workers and wRNA = wL for their unambitious colleagues, irrespective
of the tournament format.15 We may think about systematic differences in ambition in terms of differences in reference
groups. For instance, high ability workers may have higher reference wages because they compare themselves only with
other talented individuals.
This section brieﬂy considers how differences in ambition (or reference groups) affect equilibrium effort levels and each
worker’s probability of winning the contest. Several assumptions are made to keep the analysis tractable. We posit that
each agent’s type is public information among the agents but is unknown to the principal and that the density g (·) of the
error difference is symmetric around its strict maximum, 0 (e.g. a normal density). More importantly, we restrict attention
to tournaments where N = 2. Thus, to focus on ambition we neglect the role that external factors such as the tournament
format have in determining the reference point.
We begin by considering the case where an ambitious and an unambitious worker compete against each other. The
ﬁrst-order conditions for the two types are given by (∂Pr(i∈W)/(∂eA,NA))(1 + ˛)w = c′(eA,NA) and (∂Pr(i∈W)/∂eNA,A)(1 +
ˇ)w = c′(eNA,A). Here ei,j , i, j∈
{
A,NA
}
, denotes the effort exertedby anagent of type i competingwith a type jworker.Note
that the symmetry of the density function implies ∂Pr(i∈W)/∂eA,NA = ∂Pr(i∈W)/∂eNA,A. Thus, if losses resonate more than
gains (˛ > ˇ), the ambitious worker will exert more effort in equilibrium than his unambitious counterpart: eA,NA > eNA,A.
This formalizes Heath et al. (1999)’s argument that “if goals act as reference points, then loss aversion implies that people
who are below their goal by x units will perceive their current performance as a loss relative to their goal; thus they will
work harder to increase their performance by a given increment than people who are above their goal by x units” (p. 85).
Furthermore, ambitious workers will also have a higher chance of winning the tournament.
position, and the corresponding decrease in the probability of not winning in the bottom one. Under the exponential distribution, increasing effort equally
reduces the probability of ending up in any position but the top one. Clearly, in both cases (11) holds. Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) use condition (11) to
show the optimality of restricting prize structures to a few distinct prizes.
15 Of course, it is perfectly possible that some workers might care about status (as deﬁned in Section 2) without being either ambitious or unambitious.
356 F. Ederer, A. Patacconi / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 75 (2010) 348–363
Using this model we can rank effort levels for any given wage spread by examining the ﬁrst-order conditions. We dis-
tinguish between segregated and mixed tournaments for ambitious and unambitious workers (in segregated tournaments,
workers are either all ambitious or unambitious). Since the density is largest when the agents exert the same level of effort,
one can easily show that segregated tournaments elicit higher equilibrium effort levels from the contestants: eA,A > eA,NA
and eNA,NA > eNA,A. Furthermore, because of loss aversion eA,NA > eNA,A. We summarize these results as follows.
Proposition 7. Ambitious workers always exert more effort in equilibrium than their unambitious colleagues when paired
together. Furthermore, both types exert more effort in a segregated tournament than in a mixed setting. Therefore eA,A >
eA,NA, eNA,NA > eNA,A.
Proposition 7 may help explain some of the conclusions of Gneezy et al. (2003) who ﬁnd marked gender differences in
performancewhencomparing individuals’ responses todifferent typesof incentives.Usingexperimental evidenceof a simple
maze game they show that women are less successful than men in mixed competitive environments (e.g., tournaments),
even though they are able to performaswell asmen in noncompetitive environments (e.g. piece-rate schemes) or segregated
competitive environments. If one is willing to assume that women are less ambitious (i.e., set lower reference wages for
themselves) than men (see, for example, Clark, 1997; Falk and Knell, 2004; Huberman et al., 2004) our model offers an
explanation for whywomenmay exert less effort and compete less ﬁercely thanmen inmixed tournaments. In particular, if
women are assumed to be less ambitious thanmen ourmodel predicts that (1) in amixed competitive environment women
should exert less effort and perform worse than men (eA,NA > eNA,A) and that (2) women should also perform better in a
segregated than in a mixed competitive environment (eNA,NA > eNA,A). These predictions are in line with the experimental
evidence of Gneezy et al. (2003) and our model coupled with the assumption of gender differences in ambition thus offers
one possible explanation for their puzzling ﬁndings. Furthermore, Gneezy et al. (2003) also ﬁnd some evidence that men
perform better than women when both are placed in segregated competitive environments and this ﬁnding is also in line
with another of our theoretical predictions (eA,A > eNA,NA).16
5. Ambition and ability
This section extends the model in Section 4 by allowing workers to differ not only in ambition but also in ability. The
production technology is now given by xi = ai + ei + εi where ai denotes agent i’s intrinsic ability and is public information
among the agents but unknown to the principal. Here ability enters additively in the production function so that themarginal
return to effort does not vary with ability. We assume that ai takes the values {aL, aH} with aH − aL = a > 0. That is, agents
can either be of low or high ability.
5.1. Correlation between ambition and ability
To study the role of correlation between ability and ambition,we consider a tournament scenariowhere agents are paired
at random from a pool of workers who are differentiated along these two dimensions. Note that since the agents’ types are
unknown to the principal, the wage spread w must be the same irrespective of the identity of the contestants. There are
equal shares of ambitious and unambitiousworkers, Pr(A) = Pr(NA) andwe further assume that the conditional probabilities
that aworker is of high (low) ability given that he is ambitious (unambitious) are givenby p = Pr(H|A) = Pr(L|NA).When p = 1
ambition and ability are perfectly positively correlated, so that all ambitious workers are more able than the unambitious
workers. Conversely, the two dimensions are perfectly negatively correlated when p = 0 and uncorrelated when p = 1/2.
The next proposition establishes how the correlation between ambition and ability inﬂuences effort levels and the selection
of able workers.
Proposition 8. In any equilibrium the ambitiousworker exertsmore effort than the unambitiousworker in the same tournament.
The probability of promoting an able worker is strictly increasing in the correlation between ability and ambition. Moreover, if
c′′′ (·) ≤ 0, then average effort is lower when ability and ambition are perfectly positively correlated than when they are perfectly
negatively correlated.17
In our setting both ambition and ability increase the probability of promotion. So it is not surprising that the probability
of promoting an able worker increases with the correlation between ability and ambition. However, Proposition Proposition
8 also highlights that if one worker is both more ambitious and of higher ability than his competitor, the odds are heavily
stacked in his favour. Thus a possible drawback of positive correlation is that it may induce low effort levels from both
contestants.
16 There is also a large empirical literature concerning gender differences in wages and promotion rates that, with some exceptions, ﬁnds lower wages
and promotion rates for women (see, e.g., Ransom and Oaxaca, 2005; Blau and DeVaro, 2007). Several papers try to disentagle whether these differences
are due to productivity or female preferences for different types of jobs or due to discrimination. If one assumes gender differences in ambition our model
predicts that women exert less effort than men in mixed gender environments and thus it offers one possible explanation for why women are less likely
to be promoted than otherwise observationally similar men. However, this explanation may not be entirely independent of discrimination since women
could be less ambitious because of a general milieu of discrimination or social pressures.
17 Condition c′′′ (·) ≤ 0 includes as a special case the quadratic cost of effort. More generally, requiring c′ to be ‘not too convex’ would sufﬁce.
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An interesting implication of our analysis is that tournament promotion systemsmight not be as ineffective as a selection
device as previously thought. Baker et al. (1988, p. 602), for instance, claim that “tournament promotions systems cannot in
general match employees to the jobs for which they are best suited” since performance in the current job might not be the
best indicator of performance in another job.What our model highlights is that, if themore able workers choose to compare
themselves to equally able workers and not to low ability workers as the evidence suggests, promotion inefﬁciencies may
be reduced.18
5.2. Managing diversity in the workplace
We now demonstrate that our framework can also usefully be applied to important problems in human resources man-
agement. Speciﬁcally, we extend our previous analysis to consider a setting where the ﬁrm can learn a worker’s type, in
particular the worker’s ambition level. A question that naturally arises in such a setting is how the ﬁrm should mix and
match its workers according to their personality traits.19
There are four contestants, two ambitious workers and two unambitious workers and the ﬁrm simultaneously runs
two promotion tournaments. In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrm designs a tournament (wH,wL) where contestants compete in
pairs and the contestant that produces the most output in each of the two tournaments is promoted and receives wH
while the loser receives wL . We denote by T > 0 the additional proﬁts that accrue to the ﬁrm when a talented worker
is promoted. In the second stage, the ﬁrm observes the workers’ ambition level and decides how to match the four
contestants.20 In the third stage, the workers observe their own ambition and ability levels and those of their respec-
tive opponent and then exert effort. Finally, output is realized, and promotion decisions are made. As before we assume
that the conditional probabilities that a worker is of high (low) ability given that he is ambitious (unambitious) are
p = Pr(H|A) = Pr(L|NA) so that ambition and ability are perfectly positively correlated if p = 1, they are perfectly negatively
correlated when p = 0 and uncorrelated when p = 1/2. In other words, when p /= 1/2 ambition is an informative signal of
ability.
In such a situation, it is natural to ask whether the ﬁrm should mix ambitious and unambitious contestants or whether
it should match similar types of workers? In other words, should the tournaments be mixed – each unambitious worker
is paired with an ambitious worker – or segregated – each (un)ambitious worker is paired with the other (un)ambitious
worker? It is important to note that the matching of similar types creates stronger incentives for effort. Equilibrium effort is
maximizedwhen contestants are evenlymatched since the density function g achieves itsmaximum at 0. Thus, themanager
will only prefer mixed tournaments to segregated tournaments when mixing is beneﬁcial in terms of selection. The next
proposition summarizes our main result.
Proposition 9. (i) Average effort is higher in segregated tournaments than in mixed tournaments. The beneﬁts of promotion can
be higher in either organization of tournaments. (ii) If p = 0, mixed tournaments are optimal when selection is important (T is
large) and the ability gap a is sufﬁciently large relative to the difference in ambition levels ˛ − ˇ. (iii) If p = 1, mixed tournaments
are optimal when selection is sufﬁciently important (T is sufﬁciently large).
The intuition for Proposition 9 is the following. Average effort is higher in segregated tournaments than inmixed tourna-
ments since in segregated tournaments the ﬁrm creates a more even playing ﬁeld between the contestants. There are two
forces that work in favour of segregated tournaments with respect to average efforts. First, segregated tournaments match
together contestants of equal ambition levels thus creating stronger incentives for effort than mixed tournaments where
contestants have different ambition levels. Second, the stronger the (positive or negative) correlation between ambition and
ability, i.e. the closer p is to 0 or to 1, the more likely it is that two workers that share the same ambition level will also share
the same ability level. This further evens the contest in a segregated tournament and thus increases incentives for effort.
Only if the ambition levels of ambitious and unambitious workers are identical, ˛ = ˇ, (thus eliminating the ﬁrst advantage
of segregated tournaments) and ambition and ability are uncorrelated, p = 1/2, (thus eliminating the second advantage)
do mixed tournaments perform as well as segregated tournaments in terms of average effort. Obviously, since segregated
tournaments always lead to higher effort, it has to be the case that selection motives are very important (T is large) if mixed
tournaments are preferred.
The choice between tournaments is less clear when considering the beneﬁts of promotion. Depending on parameter
values either segregated or mixed tournaments could be better. The trade-off in terms of selection can be clearly illustrated
18 For instance, Falk and Knell (2004) show that students with higher intellectual abilities choose higher reference standards, thus effectively comparing
themselves to similar others.
19 We are grateful to an anonymous Associate Editor for suggesting this under-researched question. Lazear (1989) also explores a related analysis of
personality traits when sabotage is possible, but agents may have a preference for cooperative behavior.
20 We make two important assumptions. The ﬁrst assumption is that there is diversity: workers of different types are willing to accept the contract
(wH,wL). This would be the case, for instance, if search costs are high enough to induce the ﬁrm to offer high wages or reservation wages are stochastic.
Here, we simply assume that workers only learn their type after accepting the contract. The second assumption is that the manager is not allowed to
change the prize structure (wH,wL) in response to new information about the workers’ types. This form of wage rigidity could easily be justiﬁed in terms
of communication or administrative costs and is, we believe, quite reasonable. The key analytical advantage of this assumption is that it facilitates the
comparison across tournament scenarios because the wage bill is ﬁxed.
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in the casewhere ambition and ability are uncorrelated, p = 1/2. Segregated tournaments are preferred in terms of selection
if
2G(a) > G(a + 1) + G(a − 3)
where 1 = eH,LA,NA − e
L,H
NA,A > 0 and 3 = e
L,H
A,NA − e
H,L
NA,A > 0. The left-hand side denotes the probability that an able worker
is promoted in the each of the two segregated tournaments. In each segregated tournament, the contestants exert equal
efforts and hence the probability that an able contestant is promoted is exactly G(a). In a mixed tournament the contestants
have different ambition levels and therefore exert different effort. The probability that a talented worker is promoted is
G(a + 1) > G(a) when the ambitious worker is more talented and the unambitious worker is less talented. In this case,
ambition and ability work hand in hand and make it more likely that the more talented worker is promoted. In contrast, the
probability of promoting a talentedworker isG(a − 3) < G(a) if the ambitiousworker is less talented than the unambitious
worker since here talent and ambition work in opposite directions.
When talent and ambition are perfectly positively correlated, talented individuals are also likely to be ambitious and
therefore win mixed tournaments more often than not. They enjoy an ability advantage and also exert more effort than
their less ambitious opponent. As a result, mixing ambitious and unambitious workers then always increases the chances
of promoting the more able worker relative to matching similar workers. If T is large enough, this selection effect can
compensate the lower equilibrium effort relative to segregated tournaments. Mixed tournaments need not be better than
segregated tournaments in terms of selection.While it is true that, ceteris paribus, more able workers are more likely to win
tournaments due to their ability advantage, when talent and ambition are negatively correlated, it is not necessarily the case
that in mixed tournaments more talented but less ambitious workers perform better on average than their less talented but
more ambitious counterparts. This is because the ambitious contestants may exert high effort in equilibrium so as to fully
compensate their ability disadvantage. Indeed, when ambition and ability are negatively correlated, for mixed tournaments
to be better in terms of selection than segregated tournaments the ability gap a has to be sufﬁciently large relative to the
difference in ambition ˛ − ˇ, since this means that the difference in effort levels between contestants of different ambition
levels will not be able to outweigh their difference in ability levels. Therefore, as Proposition 9 makes clear, the conditions
that ensure the optimality ofmixed tournaments tend to bemore restrictive under perfectly negative correlation than under
perfectly positive correlation.
The implications of Proposition 9 formanaging diversity in theworkplace can be important. Asmentioned beforewomen,
on average, are less status-seeking thanmen and hence despite high ability and talent may fail to scale the corporate ladder.
For example, only 11.7 percent of FTSE 100 directors are women, but Hewitt (2003) claims that “diversity in the boardroom
goes hand in hand with good corporate governance, better customer relations, and ultimately, is beneﬁcial to the bottom
line.” This claim is in line with our previous argument according to which women might not make it to the top of the
organization due to a lack of status concerns and ambition, but companies would nonetheless beneﬁt from promoting
the most able worker (T is large). Favourable promotion quotas for female workers might therefore improve the trade-off
between incentive provision and efﬁcient promotion decisions. In terms of our model, female workers would effectively be
placed into single-sex segregated tournament in which they would compete more intensely and the most able among them
would be promoted.
6. Concluding remarks
A large body of evidence suggests that there is a human tendency to compare outcomes with others and that individuals
are oftenmoremotivated by the desire to avoid losses than they are bymaximizing gains. The contribution of this paper has
been to introduce such status concerns in an otherwise standard tournament model and to show that this incorporation has
interesting implications for the optimal provision of incentives.
Similar to previous contributions we found that status considerations enhance incentives for effort and that a ﬁrm
can beneﬁt from such status considerations through the provision of lower monetary incentives. However, since our paper
considered contestswithmore than two agentswewere able to show that the choice of the tournament format is not neutral.
A ﬁrm is better off choosing tournaments that reward winners instead of tournaments that penalize losers. This result may
indeedbe initially surprising since for agivenwage spreaddemotion-based tournaments actuallyprovide stronger incentives
for effort. Our ﬁnding is particularly important since to our knowledge it is the ﬁrst rigorous explanation for the prevalence of
promotion-based systems and for the almost complete absence of demotion-based reward schemes documented in several
empirical studies. Our setup is quite robust to changes in the parameters that capture status preferences. It also allowed
us to show that our results apply more generally, in particular to settings where the ﬁrm is also free to choose the number
of demotions and promotions in addition to choosing the wage levels. The ﬁnding that a ﬁrm will want to minimize the
number of demotions and maximize the number of promotions (subject to a reference-wage constraint) also chimes well
with the phenomenon of job title proliferation often observed in organizations.
In the second part of the paper we extended the analysis to allow for differences in ambition and showed that such
differences could explain the differential effort and performance of men and women in mixed and segregated competitive
environments as well as offer one explanation for the observed gender wage and promotion rate gap without invoking
discrimination or differences in ability or in outside opportunities. We analyzed the role of differential ability levels of
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workers and its interaction with ambition. In contrast to previous contributions which claim that tournaments cannot in
general match employees to the jobs for which they are best suited, we showed that the adverse consequences of using
tournaments as a sorting device could be small, particularly when ambition and ability are positively correlated. However,
we also showed that the positive correlation between ability and ambition may be a double-edged sword since is also leads
to lower effort supply. Finally, we applied our model to study the question of diversity in the workplace and showed that
although organizations onlywant tomix contestantswhen the beneﬁts of selecting themore able employees are sufﬁciently
important to compensate for the resulting drop in equilibrium effort, in some situations segregated tournaments may also
improve selection.
Our analysis has left a number of interesting questions open. For instance, while our model focuses on promotions
and demotions, one may wish to consider n-prize tournaments. We expect that most if not all of our results would carry
over to this more general set-up. Although in Sections 4 and 5 we explore how heterogeneous agents compete, we do not
analyze how the principal’s proﬁt varies between the different forms of tournaments explored in Sections 2 and 3 under
contestant heterogeneity. In particular, which types of workers receive surplus in an equal-treatment tournament andwhat
are the conditions under which workers choose to self-select into the tournaments designed for them? For example, do
low-ambition workers prefer to join ﬁrms with other low-ambition workers or do they prefer to mix with high-ambition
work colleagues? Do ﬁrms then have an incentive of fostering a “common culture” where everyone in the organization has
similar preferences or a “culture of diversity” whereworkers are different? A third issue is that our discussionmainly relates
to promotion as the outcome of the tournament. This was motivated by the fact that in practice the results of a tournament
are more visible than higher pay due to pay secrecy, and that therefore interpersonal comparisons are more likely to matter
in the former case. However, it is not obvious that this needs to be the case if, for instance, the ﬁrm announces all the wages
publicly. How ﬁrms should choose between different degrees of disclosure and secrecy in wage setting in order tomaximize
workers’ incentives to work hard and to minimize the impact of competing wage offers for the successful employees by
other employers is, in our view, a promising avenue for subsequent studies. We leave the exploration of these issues to
future research.
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Appendix A. Omitted proofs
We begin with a lemma which is useful to prove Propositions 1 and 3.
Lemma 1. Consider a tournament with N contestants and NW winners. Let Pr(i∈W |NW ) denote the probability that agent i is
a winner. In a symmetric equilibrium ∂Pr(i∈W |NW )/∂ei is independent of the overall level of effort.
Proof of Lemma A.1. Let Pr(i, j) denotes contestant i’s probability of placing jth from the bottom. This
probability is given by Pr(i, j) = {[(N − 1)!]/[(N − j)!(j − 1)!]}
∫
F(ei − e∗ + εi)j−1[1 − F(ei − e∗ + εi)]N−jf (εi)dεi where e∗
denotes the equilibrium effort level of the other agents and the integral is taken on the entire support
of εi. At the symmetric equilibrium (ei = e∗), agent i has an equal chance of ending up in any position
and therefore Pr(i∈W |NW ) = NW/N. By working harder at the symmetric equilibrium there is an increased (or
decreased) chance of coming in at position j: ∂Pr(i, j)/∂ei = {[(N − 1)!]/[(N − j)!(j − 1)!]}
∫
F(εi)
j−2[1 − F(εi)]N−j−1f (εi)2{(j −
1)[1 − F(εi)] − (N − j)F(εi)}dεi. Since Pr(i∈W |NW ) =
∑N
j=N−NW Pr(i, j), ∂Pr(i∈W |NW )/∂ei =
∑N
j=N−NW+1{[(N − 1)!]/[(N −
j)!(j − 1)!]}
∫
F(εi)
j−2[1 − F(εi)]N−j−1f (εi)2{(j − 1)[1 − F(εi)] − (N − j)F(εi)}dεi. Inspection of this equation shows that
∂Pr(i∈W |NW )/∂ei is independent of the level of effort e∗. 
Proof of Proposition 3. In the benchmark casewithout status concerns, equilibriumeffort is given by the familiar condition
V = c′(eT ). In promotion-based and demotion-based tournaments, we have instead
V + N
PB
W
N
ˇ
1 + ˇ
(
∂Pr(i∈W |NPBW )
∂ei
)−1
c′′(ePB) = c′(ePB)
V − N − N
DB
W
N
˛
1 + ˛
(
∂Pr(i∈W |NDBW )
∂ei
)−1
c′′(eDB) = c′(eDB).
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Since the cost function is convex and (∂Pr(i∈W |NW ))/∂ei > 0 is independent of the overall level of e (see Lemma A.1), it
follows that ePB > eT > eDB. 
Proof of Proposition 4. If no reference group exists, the number of winners NNRW must be such that
NNRW ∈
(
NNRL − D,NNRL + D
)
. Then the reference wage is (1/N)
∑N
i=1wi and expected proﬁts are E˘
NR = VNe − N [u¯ + c(e)] −(
˛ − ˇ
)
(wH − wL)(NNRW
(
N − NNRW
)
)/N. Clearly for all e,E˘PB (e) > E˘NR (e). FromProposition2wealsoknowthatE˘PB (e) >
E˘DB (e) and that these rankings are preserved when effort levels are chosen optimally. Proposition 4 follows. 
A.1. Robustness with respect to magnitudes of ˛ and ˇ and sign of ˇ
We now show how our results change when we modify our assumptions about the relative magnitudes of ˛ and ˇ or
the sign of ˇ. First, if ˇ ≤ 0 Part (i) of Proposition 1 has to be amended. Indeed, from Lemma A.1 and Eqs. (4b) and (5b) it
then follows that equilibrium effort is lower in a promotion-based tournament than in a traditional tournament without
social comparisons. Second, if ˇ ≤ 0 Part (ii) of Proposition 1 still holds. This follows from Lemma A.1, Eqs. (5b) and (6b),
and the fact that ˛ − ˇ is now larger. Third, even if ˇ ≤ 0 expected proﬁts are higher in a promotion-based tournament than
in a demotion-based tournament provided ˇ is sufﬁciently small in absolute value relative to ˛. Indeed, Eqs. (5a) and (6a)
imply that for all e and
∣∣ˇ∣∣ small, E˘PB (e) > E˘DB (e). Let ePB and eDB denote, respectively, the effort levels that solve (5a)
and (6a). Then E˘PB
(
ePB
)
≥ E˘PB
(
eDB
)
> E˘DB
(
eDB
)
, where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the deﬁnition of optimality
and the second from the relationship between E˘PB (e) and E˘DB (e).
Proof of Proposition 5. In Section 3 we showed that it is optimal for the ﬁrm to minimize the number of demotions by
setting either w− or NL equal to zero, or both. This implies that the ﬁrm’s program (10) reduces to
max
e,NW
˘ (e,NW ) = VNe − N [u¯ + c(e)] + NW
ˇ
1 + ˇ
(
∂Pr(i∈W |NW )
∂ei
)−1
c′(e) (A.1)
which is the same expression that one would obtain in a promotion-based tournament. Here we show that pro-
vided (11) holds, it is also optimal to maximize the number of promotions NW subject to wM being the typical wage
(this requires NM ≥ NW + NL + D). A sufﬁcient condition for this to be true is that ˘ (e,NW + 1) ≥ ˘ (e,NW ) ⇔ (NW +
1)/(∂Pr(i∈W |NW + 1)/∂ei) ≥ NW/(∂Pr(i∈W |NW )/∂ei) for all NW = 1,2, . . . ,
⌊
(N − D)/2
⌋
. This last condition can be rewrit-
ten as 1/NW∂Pr(i∈W |NW )/∂ei ≥ ∂Pr(i∈W |NW + 1)/∂ei − ∂Pr(i∈W |NW )/∂ei, which, since Pr(i∈W |NW ) =
∑N
j=N−NW Pr(i, j),
is equivalent to (11). Thus, if (11) holds, the ﬁrm has an incentive to always increase the number of promotions subject to
NM ≥ NW + NL + D. Proposition 5 then easily follows. 
Proof of Proposition6. Webeginby showing that in a three-prize tournament theﬁrmalways chooses to create a reference
group. Then we prove that setting wR = wM is optimal.
For any given reference wage wR ∈ [wL,wH], the expected utility of a worker is given by Pr(i∈W)[wH + ˇ(wH − wR)] +
Pr(i∈M)[wL + z(wM − wR)] + Pr(i∈ L)[wL + ˛(wL − wR)] − c(ei) where z = ˛ if wM ≤ wR, and z = ˇ if wM > wR. Since in equi-
librium all agents exert the same level of effort and the participation constraint binds, expected proﬁts can be written as
E˘NR = VNe − N [u¯ + c(e)] + ˇNW (wH − wR) + zNM(wM − wR) + ˛NL(wL − wR).
Note that E˘T ≥ E˘NR is equivalent to ˇNW (wH − wR) + zNM(wM − wR) + ˛NL(wL − wR) ≤ 0 (recall that E˘T denotes
expected proﬁts in the traditional case where ˛ = ˇ = 0). Let nj = Nj/N, j = W,M, L andwrk = wr − wk, r, k = H,M, L. After
some manipulations, E˘T ≥ E˘NR yields
(
˛ − ˇ
)
nLnWwHL + (˛ − z)nLnMwML +
(
z − ˇ
)
nMnWwHM ≥ 0. This inequal-
ity is always veriﬁed since ˛ > ˇ. Thus setting wR = 1/N
∑N
i wi cannot be optimal since the ﬁrm can do strictly better by
choosing a promotion-based tournament (indeed, E˘PB ≥ E˘T ). Hence the ﬁrm will always create a reference group.
Next, we show that setting wR = wM is optimal. Consider the case where wR = wL (setting wR = wH is clearly
suboptimal). At the symmetric equilibrium, each worker’s effort solves (∂Pr(i∈W)/∂ei)(1 + ˇ)w+ − (∂Pr(i∈ L)/∂ei)(1 +
ˇ)w− = c′(e), where w+ = wH − wM and w− = wM − wL . Furthermore, because the participation constraint binds,
NWwH + NLwL + NMwM = N [u¯ + c(e)] − NWˇ(wH − wL) − NMˇ(wM − wL). The ﬁrm thereforemaximizesVNe − N [u¯ + c(e)] +
NWˇw+ + (NW + NM)ˇw− with respect to w+,w−,NW,NL , subject to the incentive compatibility constraint. Pro-
vided ∂Pr(i∈W)/∂ei > 0, this program can be written as
max
e,w−,NW ,NL
VNe − N [u¯ + c(e)] + ˇ
1 + ˇ
NWc′(e)
∂Pr(i∈W)
∂ei
+ Aˇw−
where A ≡ [1 + (∂Pr(i∈ L)/∂ei)/(∂Pr(i∈W)/∂ei)]NW + NM . Note that for any given NW,NL, e, A is a constant. There are three
possibilities: either A > 0, A < 0 or A = 0. In the ﬁrst case, it is clearly optimal tomaximizew− subject towM ∈ [wL,wH] and
therefore wM = wH . If A < 0, instead, it is optimal to set wM = wL . If A = 0 any wM would do, and in particular wM = wH or
wM = wL . Thus, without loss of generality, if wR = wL we can restrict attention to a tournament with only two prizes where
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the lowest wage is the reference wage. This is precisely the deﬁnition of a promotion-based tournament. We also know
that if wR = wM , then it is optimal to set NL = 0 and create a promotion-based tournament (Proposition 5). Thus equilibrium
proﬁts when wR = wM must be the same as when wR = wL . Setting wR = wM is therefore optimal. 
Proof of Proposition 7. The ﬁrst-order conditions for effort with equal prize spreads are as follows: g(0)(1 + ˛)w =
c′(eA,A) in segregated tournament with only ambitious workers; g(0)(1 + ˇ)w = c′(eNA,NA) in segregated tournament with
only unambitious workers; and g(eA,N − eNA,A)(1 + ˛)w = c′(eA,NA) and g(eA,NA − eNA,A)(1 + ˇ)w = c′(eNA,A) in mixed
tournament, for ambitious and unambitious workers, respectively. Since the density g achieves its strict maximum at 0,
eA,A > eA,NA and eNA,NA > eNA,A. Furthermore, as shown in the main text, eA,NA > eNA,A because of loss aversion. This proves
Proposition 7. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Let equilibrium effort levels be denoted by ek,h
i,j
where i, j∈
{
NA,A
}
and k, h∈
{
L,H
}
. Thus ek,h
i,j
is
the effort exerted by an agent of type (i, k) competing with a type (j, h) worker. We consider the case of perfectly positive
and negative correlation between ambition and ability (the case when workers are equally able has been studied in Section
4). From the ﬁrst-order conditions the following relations for equilibrium effort are obtained:
g(a + eH,LA,NA − e
L,H
NA,A)(1 + ˛)w = c′(e
H,L
A,NA)
g(eL,HNA,A − e
H,L
A,NA − a)(1 + ˇ)w = c′(e
L,H
NA,A)
g(eL,HA,NA − e
H,L
NA,A − a)(1 + ˛)w = c′(e
L,H
A,NA)
g(a + eH,LNA,A − e
L,H
A,NA)(1 + ˇ)w = c′(e
H,L
NA,A).
For instance, the ﬁrst two equations deﬁne equilibrium effort levels when an ambitious and high ability worker is paired in a
tournamentwith an ambitious, low abilityworker.We begin by showing that ambitiousworkers exertmore effort than their
unambitious counterparts in the same tournament: eL,HA,NA > e
H,L
NA,A and e
H,L
A,NA > e
L,H
NA,A. We already know from Section 4 that
eL,LA,NA > e
L,L
NA,A and e
H,H
A,NA > e
H,H
NA,A. Since the density function g (·) is symmetric around zero, g(a + e
H,L
A,NA − e
L,H
NA,A) = g(e
L,H
NA,A −
eH,LA,NA − a) and g(e
L,H
A,NA − e
H,L
NA,A − a) = g(a + e
H,L
NA,A − e
L,H
A,NA). The above ﬁrst-order conditions and ambition differences (˛ > ˇ)
then imply eH,LA,NA > e
L,H
NA,A and e
L,H
A,NA > e
H,L
NA,A.
Next, we show that the probability of promoting an able worker is strictly increasing in the correlation between ability
and ambition. When drawing and pairing two workers at random the probability that an able worker is promoted is
 = 1
4
+ 1
2
p2G
(
eH,LA,NA − e
L,H
NA,A + a
)
+ 1
2
(1 − p)2G
(
eH,LNA,A − e
L,H
A,NA + a
)
+ p(1 − p)G (a) + 0
Differentiating this expression with respect to p yields
d
dp
= p
[
G
(
eH,LA,NA − e
L,H
NA,A + a
)
− G(A)
]
+ (1 − p)
[
G(a) − G
(
eH,LNA,A − e
L,H
A,NA + a
)]
> 0
since G
(
eH,LA,NA − e
L,H
NA,A + a
)
> G (a) > G
(
eH,LNA,A − e
L,H
A,NA + a
)
for all p∈ [0,1]. Thus the probability of promoting an able worker
is strictly increasing in the correlation parameter p.
Finally,we show that if c′′′ (·) ≤ 0, then average effort is lowerwhenability and ambition are perfectly positively correlated
than when they are perfectly negatively correlated. The difference in average efforts exerted when p = 1 and when p = 0 is
given by
E
[∑
i=1,2
ei
]∣∣∣∣∣
p=1
− E
[∑
i=1,2
ei
]∣∣∣∣∣
p=0
= 1
2
[
eH,LA,NA + e
L,H
NA,A − e
H,L
NA,A − e
L,H
A,NA
]
.
Thus it sufﬁces to show that c′′′ ≤ 0 implies eL,HA,NA > e
H,L
A,NA and e
H,L
NA,A > e
L,H
NA,A.
¿From the ﬁrst-order conditions it follows that eL,HA,NA > e
H,L
A,NA ⇔ g(3 − a) > g(a + 1) where 3 ≡ e
L,H
A,NA −
eH,LNA,A > 0 and 1 ≡ e
H,L
A,NA − e
L,H
NA,A > 0. Since g (·) is single-peaked around 0 and a > 0, g(3 − a) > g(a + 1) implies
3 − a∈ (−a − 1, a + 1). Obviously 3 − a > −a − 1. Now suppose by contradiction that 3 − a ≥ a + 1. Rear-
ranging the ﬁrst-order conditions one obtains 1 = h (g(a + 1) (1 + ˛)w) − h
(
g(a + 1)
(
1 + ˇ
)
w
)
and 3 =
h (g(3 − a) (1 + ˛)w) − h
(
g(3 − a)
(
1 + ˇ
)
w
)
, where h ≡ (c′)−1. Note that h is strictly increasing and weakly convex
since c′′ > 0 and c′′′ ≤ 0. Let z = g(3 − a) (1 + ˛)w − g(3 − a)
(
1 + ˇ
)
w. Then
1 > h
(
g(a + 1)
(
1 + ˇ
)
w + z
)
− h
(
g(a + 1)
(
1 + ˇ
)
w
)
≥ h
(
g(3 − a)
(
1 + ˇ
)
w + z
)
− h
(
g(3 − a)
(
1 + ˇ
)
w
)
= h (g(3 − a) (1 + ˛)w) − h
(
g(3 − a)
(
1 + ˇ
)
w
)
= 3
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where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that h is strictly increasing and g(a + 1) (1 + ˛)w > g(a +
1)
(
1 + ˇ
)
w + z (since by assumption g(3 − a) < g(a + 1)) and the second from the convexity of h. But then3 − a <
a + 1 – a contradiction. Thus it must be that eL,HA,NA > e
H,L
A,NA. A similar argument shows that e
H,L
NA,A > e
L,H
NA,A. We conclude that
eH,LA,NA + e
L,H
NA,A − e
H,L
NA,A − e
L,H
A,NA < 0. The difference in average efforts exerted between the case where p = 1 and the case where
p = 0 is therefore negative. 
Proof of Proposition 9. The payoff from sorting workers into two segregated tournaments is
˘S = 2p2eH,HA,A + 2p(1 − p)(e
H,L
A,A + e
L,H
A,A) + 2(1 − p)
2eL,LA,A + 2p2e
L,L
NA,NA + 2p(1 − p)(e
H,L
NA,NA + e
L,H
NA,NA) + 2(1 − p)
2eH,HNA,NA
+ T
[
p2 + (1 − p)2 + 4p(1 − p)G(a)
]
where the terms in the ﬁrst and second line are the effort levels chosen in the tournament of the two ambitious workers and
the two unambitious workers and the third line captures the beneﬁts from promoting an able worker. Similarly, the payoff
from sorting workers into two mixed tournament is
˘M = 2p2(eH,LA,NA + e
L,H
NA,A) + 2p(1 − p)(e
H,H
A,NA + e
H,H
NA,A) + 2p(1 − p)(e
L,L
A,NA + e
L,L
NA,A) + 2(1 − p)
2(eL,HA,NA + e
H,L
NA,A)
+ T
[
2p2q + 2(1 − p)2r + 2p(1 − p)
]
where q = G(a + eH,LA,NA − e
L,H
NA,A) and r = G(a + e
H,L
NA,A − e
L,H
A,NA) and q ≥ G(a) ≥ r. Note that, for simplicity, V is normalized to 1 in
both cases.
We can rewrite the proﬁts from two segregated tournaments as
˘S = 2p2(eH,HA,A + e
L,L
NA,NA) + 2p(1 − p)(e
H,L
A,A + e
L,H
A,A) + 2p(1 − p)(e
H,L
NA,NA + e
L,H
NA,NA) + 2(1 − p)
2(eL,LA,A + e
H,H
NA,NA)
+ T
[
p2 + (1 − p)2 + 4p(1 − p)G(a)
]
and two mixed tournament as
˘M = 2p2(eH,LA,NA + e
L,H
NA,A) + 2p(1 − p)(e
H,H
A,NA + e
H,H
NA,A) + 2p(1 − p)(e
L,L
A,NA + e
L,L
NA,A) + 2(1 − p)
2(eL,HA,NA + e
H,L
NA,A)
+ T
[
2p2q + 2(1 − p)2r + 2p(1 − p)
]
We ﬁrst show that average effort is always higher in segregated tournaments than in mixed tournaments. The difference
in average efforts between segregated and mixed tournaments is strictly increasing in ˛ − ˇ. For ˛ − ˇ = 0 the difference in
average efforts is given by
2 [1 − 4p(1 − p)] [g(0) − g(a)] (2 + ˛ + ˇ) ≥ 0
since 1 − 4p(1 − p) ≥ 0 and g(0) > g(a) and hence average effort is always higher in segregated tournaments. Segregated
and mixed tournaments yield the same average effort if ˛ − ˇ = 0 and p = 1/2.
Next, the difference in promotion beneﬁts between segregated and mixed tournaments is given by
T
{
[1 − 4p(1 − p)] (1 − 2G(a)) + 2p2 (G(a) − q) + 2(1 − p)2(G(a) − r)
}
where since 1 − 4p(1 − p) ≥ 0, (1 − 2G(a)) ≤ 0 and q ≥ G(a) ≥ r the ﬁrst two terms are negative and the third term is positive.
Thus, depending on parameter values, this expression can be positive or negative. For p = 1/2, segregated tournaments are
better in terms of selection if 2G(a) > r + q. This proves Part (i).
Part (ii). Ambition and ability are perfectly negatively correlated (p = 0). The payoff that accrues to the ﬁrm when two
segregated tournaments are simultaneously run is 2(eL,LA,A + e
H,H
NA,NA) + T since exactly one talented worker is promoted. The
payoff when two mixed tournaments are run is 2(eL,HA,NA + e
H,L
NA,A + rT). Since e
L,L
A,A > e
L,H
A,NA and e
H,H
NA,NA > e
H,L
NA,A, average effort
is greater in segregated tournaments. Thus, for the mixed tournament setup to perform better, it must be that T (2r − 1) is
positive and sufﬁciently large. This is the case if r > 1/2 (that is, if a is large relative to ˛ − ˇ) and A is sufﬁciently large. This
proves Part (ii).
Part (iii). Ambition and ability are perfectly positively correlated (p = 1). In segregated tournaments the payoff is 2(eH,HA,A +
eL,LNA,NA) + T since exactly one talented worker is promoted. In mixed tournaments, the payoff is 2(e
H,L
A,NA + e
L,H
NA,A + qT). Since
eH,HA,A > e
H,L
A,NA and e
L,L
NA,NA > e
L,H
NA,A average effort is higher in the segregated tournaments, but the expected beneﬁts from
promoting a talented worker are higher when organizing mixed tournaments since q > 1/2. This proves Part (iii). 
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